After the results of the first round of presidential elections in Brazil of last October 4, it is evident voters are highly divided in the South American giant. Flavio Baby Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro (January 2019-January 2023), captured 47 percent of votes against 45 percent taken by Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva. Although the results, in principle, do not look catastrophic for the current President of Brazil, there seems to be very little room of maneuver against what many perceive as the “fatigue of business as usual.”
Many in Latin America have warned that left-wing governments have become the exception, due to a wave of libertarian, right and ultra-right politicians elected in recent years. Until now, there is a much smaller group of countries with left-wing governments: besides Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Uruguay plus Cuba and Nicaragua. Why is this happening and what are the consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean?
To start with, there is truly a “Donald Trump effect.” Current politicians like Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele, José Antonio Kast, Abelardo de la Espriella, Daniel Noboa, Nasry Asfura and Laura Fernández, to mention a few, have benefited from the endorsement of the Trump administration, of their respective candidacies.
Take Honduras as an example. The country, more than its neighbors, has been under the direct influence of the United States since the 19th century. From the incursions of imperial adventurers like the filibuster William Walker to the US-style two-party system that emerged in the 1980s—including the banana enclaves of the United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit Company— Washington has always exerted its influence. This was the case in 2009, when the military ousted President Manuel Zelaya. The justification was that he was heading toward an unconstitutional second term, but the underlying reason was actually that Zelaya—despite being a member of the country's traditional elite—had dared to challenge the unchecked power of the dominant groups linked to Washington and transnational corporations.
The coup d'état was followed by 12 years of resistance by the population—particularly labor unions, Indigenous organizations, student associations, and feminist groups—against the National Party’s so-called "narco-dictatorship," which had been formally confirmed three times at the polls in elections marked by suspicion. From this broad movement emerged the Liberty and Refoundation (LIBRE) party, which identifies as "democratic socialist"— a rarity in a country with a deeply rooted anti-communist tradition. Founded by Zelaya himself—who continues to preside over the party, acting as a moderator among its numerous factions—LIBRE won the 2021 presidential election with over 50 percent of the vote, bringing Xiomara Castro, the former leader's wife, to power. Then LIBRE and Castro failed to meet the expectations -which is something common that explains the new wave toward libertarian and right and far-right candidates throughout the continent.
Thus, many of the Castro administration's reformist projects stalled due to a lack of a congressional majority; the party's radical base was often frustrated by compromises made with the old elite; and sadly, the reality had to be faced that LIBRE was not immune to corruption or ties to the country's omnipresent drug cartels—nor did the image created by the inclusion of so many members of the Zelaya family in public office help matters.
That was the prevailing environment during the 2025 presidential elections. The government never managed to impose its own narrative in the face of negative coverage by the media and conservative influencers. That set the path for the electoral defeat of LIBRE. The old order prevailed: the National Party, with its candidate Nasry Asfura, finished slightly ahead of the self-proclaimed anti-corruption crusader Salvador Nasralla, who ran this time under the Liberal Party banner. These parties represent the traditional two-party system—with the National Party positioned somewhat further to the right than the Liberal Party—and both are historically anti-communist and pro-US. Nasralla, a former television presenter and populist, had previously run in 2021 with his own party, *Salvador de Honduras*, in a coalition with LIBRE; he served as First Presidential Designate—a role equivalent to vice president—until April 2024, before eventually distancing himself from Xiomara Castro’s government. Once the elections took place and after the tallying of 99 percent of the ballots in an interminable count, Asfura and Nasralla were tied with around 40 percent of the vote each, with a slight lead for Asfura. The LIBRE candidate, former Defense Minister Rixi Moncada, finished third with 19 percent of the vote. Contrary to Brazil, there is no runoff election in Honduras which means the candidate with the most votes is automatically elected President of the Republic.
Many weeks passed and both Asfura and Nasralla claimed their respective victories. Then Donald Trump threatened that unless “his candidate” -Asfura- won, the US would review its bilateral relations with the Central American country. Tegucigalpa and Washington have a migration bilateral agreement where 100 000 Hondurans with special visas can work in the US, and their remittances are crucial for the economy of a country in pain. Possible deportations from the US would provoke a terrible damage to Honduras.
The case of Honduras, unfortunately, Is not exceptional. Donald Trump has also influenced the elections of other Latin American countries. In the case of Flavio Bolsonaro, it is clear the interest of Washington to support his victory over Lula with whom Trump has had political clashes.
During the 2022 elections, the candidates were Lula and Jair Bolsonaro. The victory of the former was possible due to the mistakes of Bolsonaro’s presidency, -including the way he handled the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the results showed a polarized population: with 50. 9 percent of votes, Lula emerged with a victory over Bolsonaro who got 49. 1 percent. Of course, Bolsonaro claimed fraud was in the making and did not recognize Lula’s victory. This is why he was convicted by Brazil's Supreme Court of plotting a coup d'état to overturn the 2022 presidential election results and remain in power. In September 2025, a five-judge panel of the Brazilian Supreme Court voted 4–1 to convict Bolsonaro on five charges, including attempting a military coup, leading an armed criminal organization, and attempting to violently abolish the democratic rule of law. He was sentenced to 27 years and 3 months in prison and barred from holding public office. Prosecutors and federal police showed that Bolsonaro and his allies drafted emergency decrees to suspend the election, pressured military commanders to support a takeover, and planned actions against rivals—including President-elect Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. The conspiracy culminated in the January 8, 2023, Brasília riots, where his supporters stormed government buildings to force a military intervention. This situation recalls the time when after the 2020 US elections Trump did not recognize Joe Biden’s victory and then his supporters entered Capitol Hill challenging democracy and political institutions.
Donald Trump warned that unless charges against Jair Bolsonaro were removed, high tariffs would be imposed against Brazil. President Lula Da Silva accused Trump of intervening in the internal affairs of Brazil. Donald Trump's administration punished Brazil by imposing a 50 percent tariff on Brazilian imports, revoking US visas for eight Brazilian Supreme Court justices, and applying sanctions under the Magnitsky Act (asset freezes and financial restrictions) against Justice Alexandre de Moraes.
Being that Brazil is the most populated, the biggest and more important economy in Latin America, it is understandable the interest of Trump that the next President of Brazil is someone with whom he could have a closer relationship and ideological affinity.
Yet, besides the open intervention of Trump in the Brazilian elections, one may recognize there is a generational gap. Lula, who next October 27 will be 81, is too old to lead a country that he has already led three times. His priorities are well-known and some Brazilians endorse them and some others do not. Baby Bolsonaro, at 45 is a new kid on the block. He belongs to a younger generation. He is distanced from his father, who belongs to the military and is clearly a hard-liner. Instead, Baby Bolsonaro has created an image as a lawyer, a family man that appears at public rallies with his wife and daughters. This helps to moderate the perception that he is a conservative although he favors private property, corporate interests, that supports traditional family values and endorses a strategic alliance with the United States. Lula has done an acceptable job in economics, climate change, employment and social programs, and foreign policy. His emphasis on fighting poverty, expanding industry and promoting sustainability are the core of his reelection campaign.
Organized crime is one of the most challenges security problems in Latin America and the narrative of conservatives, far right and libertarians promising security to voters, so far, has been very persuasive. Baby Bolsonaro has promised to fight organized crime and because Lula has not succeeded in this area many believe a change of command is necessary. On the economy, Bolsonaro has promised to lower inflation, cut government spending—including plans to introduce a public debt ceiling—and bolster Brazil’s critical minerals sector. He has also said that he will promote an amnesty—or if that fails, a pardon—to his father and others convicted of involvement in the January 2023 riots.
Left wing governments throughout the world have faced difficulties in convincing voters after the end of real socialism and the fall of the Soviet Union. It is true that, with some exceptions -like Cuba and Nicaragua-, leftists have moderated their narratives to capture the attention of voters. They have also nurtured from the mistakes of center and right-wing governments. Yet, they make mistakes and fail in sorting out national priorities and keeping their promises. But history repeats itself: it is like a pendulum: it goes right and left.
Some facts add to the complexity of elections in Brazil and other countries: the use of social networks, influencers and fake news. Voters tend to get information from social networks where virtually anybody may create a conspiracy theory, and have it repeated it once and again until it becomes true. No matter how rational the narrative of a candidate may be: fake news can destroy reputations and credibility in a matter of seconds.
In Latin America democracies are weak and in Mexico, for instance, political parties are the most untrust institutions. This paves the way for personalistic leaderships or “caudillos” who are more important than platforms or political programs. The key topics throughout the region are security, sovereignty, corruption and affordability -meaning the decline of the standards of living of the population.
In Brazil, it seems Baby Bolsonaro by distancing himself from his father, has gained the favor of voters. But he himself has been accused of corruption. Investigators are probing roughly 12 US million transferred in 2025 by jailed Banco Master owner Daniel Vorcaro to a US-based fund linked to Baby Bolsonaro’s brother, Eduardo. Baby Bolsonaro admits to asking for financial backing from Vorcaro, claiming the money was a private sponsorship to fund “The Dark Horse,” an unreleased film about his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro. Federal police and prosecutors suspect the funds may have been used to cover U.S. expenses, help finance political agendas, or shield money from judicial scrutiny rather than going directly to a legitimate movie production.
What about Lula? As it is well known, he went to jail because he was convicted of passive corruption and money laundering in connection with Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), a massive anti-corruption investigation in Brazil. Lula was accused of accepting bribes from a construction company in the form of a renovated triplex apartment in Guarujá and improvements to a country property in Atibaia, in exchange for helping the firm secure lucrative contracts with the state-run oil company Petrobras. He was originally sentenced by Judge Sergio Moro in 2017 to over nine years in prison, a term later increased by an appeals court to more than 12 years. Lula surrendered in April 2018 and spent 580 days imprisoned at the Federal Police headquarters in Curitiba before being released in November 2019. In March 2021, Brazil's Supreme Federal Court (STF) annulled all of Lula's convictions, ruling that the Curitiba court lacked proper legal jurisdiction over the cases. This was key for the participation of Lula at the 2022 presidential elections.
So, if you were a voter in Brazil, who would you vote for? As suggested, there is little room of maneuver for both candidates, but Lula seems to be in a more difficult position because he has served as President three times, he is almost 81 years old, and he represents the “business as usual” that many dislike. As for Baby Bolsonaro is concerned, he may win due to the so-called “vote against Lula”, not necessarily because of the appealing of the conservative candidate. The runoff next October 25 will be extremely interesting to follow. But one thing is for certain: the results will have important implications in Latin America and the world.
Editor’s Note: The above guest column was penned by María Cristina Rosas, a professor and researcher in the faculty of political and social sciences at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City. The column appears in The Rio Grande Guardian International News Service with the permission of the author. Rosas can be reached via email at: mcrosas@prodigy.net.mx
